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ABSTRACT
Shannon A. S. Roberson (Master of Arts in English Language and Literature)
From Small Beginnings to Large-Scale Harm: On Demagoguery and Misogyny in the Classroom
and Writing Center
Directed by Caddie Alford
My project is grounded in the rhetorical concept of aretê—excellence or virtue—as it
relates to education and educational spaces within demagogic and misogynist cultural forces.
The problems of demagoguery and misogyny stem from small-scale perpetuation of agonistic
norms that go unaddressed in U.S. culture, a culture that is deeply identity-driven. These forces
persist on social media platforms and within patriarchal systems of education.
For my project, I suggest rhetorical media literacy education of small-scale demagoguery
moments on social media as a way to bring awareness to larger-scale events. On a micro-scale,
social media influencers cultivate behaviors that mimic demagogic norms: charismatic
leadership, propagation of in-group/out-group binaries, and personalized echo chambers.
Bringing awareness to how influencers function and use social media to their benefit empowers
consumers to understand when or if someone is acting demagogically. Empowerment is a way to
support students as they achieve pedagogical aretê.
To address misogyny, I turn to the university writing center space to demonstrate how
feminist rhetorical pedagogy can and do inhabit patriarchal academic systems. Writing centers
act as peripheral academic spaces on university campuses while stull supporting a student’s quest
for aretê. Writing consultants use rhetorical listening practices to bring the invisible steps of the
writing process to light during consultations. In a writing center, rhetorical listening is an act of
feminist pedagogy that promotes socially engaged collaboration. Arming students with an
understanding of their personal writing style, voice, and process fosters ownership of their ideas,
combating misogynist and patriarchal constraints and paving the way for pedagogical aretê.
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INTRODUCTION
“It is important to see that we don’t just talk about arguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose
arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and we defend our own.
We gain and lose ground. We plan and use strategies. If we find a position indefensible, we can abandon it and take
a new line of attack. Many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war. Though
there is no physical battle, there is a verbal battle, and the structure of an argument— attack, defense, counterattack,
etc. — reflects this. It is in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is one that we live by in this culture; it
structures the actions we perform in arguing.”
— George Lakoff and Mark Johnson Metaphors We Live By 4

How we talk about argument is how we understand the concept of argument. In the quote
above, Lakoff and Johnson reveal the framework in which argument lives—a metaphor of war
(4). In argument we attack or defend, we have strong or weak points, we win or lose. Over time,
the refrain “argument is war” has become ingrained in the way we think about verbal debate.
More than that, it simply is how we argue in most contexts, whether the arguments are done
publicly or privately. Lakoff and Johnson ask us to imagine a culture in which argumentative
encounters were done not verbally, but performed as a dance, a physical performance wherein
aesthetics determined a successful outcome (5). We would not see this event as an argument;
rather, we would see it as something completely different because it lacks the aspect of verbal
battle that we expect from argumentation. The roots of how we talk about and perceive argument
originate in ancient Greece, from a time when public, physical agonism determined the moral
virtue of the young men who sought to achieve aretȇ.
The ancient Greek concept of aretȇ is associated with the “goodness, courage, and
prowess of a warrior” (Hawhee 187). The warrior—the person who is brave, strong, godlike,
honorable, and possibly destined to die in battle—was the epitome of virtuosity. Aretȇ, known as
virtue or “excellence in moral conduct,” gained its original expression in Homer’s poetic legend,
the Iliad (Coogan 74). Achilles, trained under the wise centaur Chiron and counseled further by
Phoenix, achieves aretȇ by learning virtuous rules of combat and social conduct. Becoming
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virtuous required being dedicated and loyal through service to the state. Counseling, tutelage,
and training are a form of pedagogy from which young noblemen could achieve aretȇ by
committing to the quest under the guidance of an elder exemplar. Performing heroic acts for the
good of the state was grounded in Sparta’s militaristic society, in contrast to Athenian scribal
culture where ancient Greek philosophy and rhetoric were evolving with a preference toward
intellectual character. By emphasizing intellect and mentorship, rhetorical pedagogy formally
began to take root in Athenian culture through Socratic teachings and dialogues, as documented
and represented by Plato. Both scribal and militaristic cultures, however, understood aretȇ as a
goal: to be successful both in war for the state and in debate for the self were achievements of the
highest moral virtue and excellence.
Aretȇ occurs by dedicating oneself to the quest—that is, aretȇ is achieved through a
journey, not as an end alone. Questing is a “continual pursuit of virtuosity” (Hawhee 192). What
matters for aretȇ “is not the victory per se but rather the hunt for the victory” (192). Aretȇ is not
something that someone can just stumble upon or luck into. Aretȇ takes dedication and training
from a mentor or tutor. Once a student is able to imitate or reproduce the skill/work of their
exemplar, the moment is marked as the achievement of aretȇ. The concept and practice of Aretȇ
has persisted through the ages and exists even today in modern American athletic and rhetorical
pursuits. While these two broad disciplines take different routes to achieve excellence, both
value the quest/training.
Though the idea of the contest is commonly associated with combative athleticism,
rhetoric and athletics share similar methodologies when it comes to agonistic and competitive
encounters. Athletic aretȇ and rhetorical aretȇ share a common metaphor and vocabulary, much
like Lakoff and Johnson describe above. During the Olympic Games of ancient Greece,
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wrestling garnered attention so much so that rhetors like Gorgias started to use the language of
wrestling to display the risk and cleverness of oratory (Hawhee 201). In his speech at the
Olympic Games, Gorgias explained that
a contest (agônisma) such as we have requires double excellence (dittôn areiôn): daring
(tolmês) and skill (sophia), daring is needed to withstand danger, and skill to understand
how to trip the opponent (pligma). For surely speech, like the summons at the Olympic
Games, calls the willing but crowns the capable (DK 82.B.8 in O’Regan 13).
An opponent can be tripped up in both athletics and speech; likewise, both require skill, cunning,
and flexibility to achieve excellence. Skill at speaking makes one strong in verbal struggle or
contest, but skill doesn’t form or manifest in an asocial vacuum—it affects other people. To
achieve excellence, aretȇ has an implied ability to “help friends and harm enemies” (O’Regan
12). In athletic aretȇ, this implication is clear—physical valor of a knight was glorified for the
good of the state (friends) in opposition to those who wish to harm the state (enemies). But in
rhetorical aretȇ, values of persuasion point to similar agonistic technologies: “the tongue
replaces the hand; the word, the sword; powerful speaking, physical might” (13). The metaphor
of argument thus comes to life.
The legacy of agonist verbal encounters persists today—perhaps nowhere so urgently as
with demagogic and patriarchal dynamics. With demagoguery, the rhetorical verbal violence is
for the good of the individual—discourse informed by demagogic conditions enact harm against
those who disagree. Similarly, misogyny works in favor of the individual by subordinating and
punishing an Other. And, of course, these two strains of agonism are both amplified and
sustained by digital forms of communication. As an educator, I am interested in exploring how
pedagogical practices can support questing for aretȇ within the modern agonistic encounters
dictated by demagogic and patriarchal systems. How can educators enable 21st century students
to achieve personal excellence in a divisive digital era? How can educators or tutors bridge the
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gap between feminist pedagogies and a misogynist, patriarchal academy? Agonistic
communication is weaponized in the political reports circulating on social media platforms, in
the identity policing on Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit feeds, and even in campus spaces where
Others are further marginalized. My project interrogates these micro-aggressions and routine
communicative habits to demonstrate that these small-scale manifestations of agonism can feed
into dominant cultural norms (demagoguery, misogyny). I aim to support disrupting these norms
by reframing contemporary educational practices as quests for aretȇ, all of which, I argue, must
be responsive to our networked age.
In Chapter One, I begin with an example of large-scale demagoguery by turning to tweets
Donald Trump posted during his 2016 election campaign. Trump uses Twitter to incite his
prolific, and often violent, base of supporters for personal gain—notably, at the expense of
someone else. Trump’s large-scale demagoguery, that is, his national and international platform
as president of the United States, lends credence to Lakoff and Johnson’s suggestion that the
“argument is war” metaphor structures actual argumentation. His posts resulted in physical
threats and verbal attacks on a private citizen, with no remorse or acknowledgment from Trump
himself. His lack of mediation between an offensive, threatening base and a private American
citizen conveyed implicit support for those who choose to act on his behalf. Trump’s public
(mis)behavior reinspired a call to action from advocates for more civic-minded media literacy
education.
I take up that call for media literacy and extend it by suggesting that while the Virginia
Standards of Learning (SOLs) lay out a pathway for media literacy pedagogy, what is really
needed is a rhetorical media literacy pedagogy. The harm that can lead to large-scale forms of
demagoguery stem from smaller interactions that normalize such behavior. What we consider
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normal behavior on social media may actually be more insidious, inciting the same large-scale
forms of demagoguery that worked to elect Trump in 2016. Therefore, in this chapter I turn to
the dynamic between social media influencers and the networks they cultivate. Our students
navigate this dynamic every day. Every day they maneuver through small-scale forms of
demagoguery on social media: influencers utilize demagoguery’s rule of “identity as logic” to
create an “us” versus a “them” (Roberts-Miller Democracy 7). To illustrate this dynamic, I
analyze the Fyre Festival’s social media campaign, which demonstrates the extent to which
social group membership has become a persuasive and alluring appeal at the cost of all else. Of
course, social media influence is an issue that extends beyond the Instagram platform to all social
networking media. To advocate for a rhetorical media literacy pedagogy, I use examples of
small-scale demagoguery to instruct and scaffold understanding of larger-form persuasive forces,
all of which impede a student’s journey toward excellence.
In Chapter Two, I continue interrogating agonism’s legacy by addressing the ongoing
exigencies of patriarchal and misogynistic forms of violence that work to ignore and stifle Other
and feminine acts of rhetorical discourse. I begin the chapter with a look into Hillary Clinton’s
style of campaigning during the 2016 election. Her approach was noticeably different from that
of her opponent because she employed feminine rhetorical listening during her town hall
meetings and other interactions with constituents. The public saw Clinton’s approach as
dramatically different than the normalized masculine approach to which they were accustomed.
The perception of her campaign was wrought with misogyny and misogynist expectations
because she was steadfast in her feminist approach.
From Clinton’s campaign, I delve into a smaller-scale patriarchal hierarchical system.
One such system of patriarchal control is the academy wherein standard language ideology (SLI)
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has persisted as the normal expectation for academic writing and student voice. SLI prevents
successful journeys towards aretê for students who are marginalized by patriarchal systems
within higher education. While SLI may support one type of student’s journey towards aretȇ,
marginalized Othered students are left in the wake of a patriarchal system that suggests their
voice is a problem that must be fixed. Misogyny and racism operate as ways of policing Others
in a patriarchal system that relies on maintaining the status quo. To address this legacy of
agonism, I claim that the writing center can teach us forms of rhetorical listening and mentoring
that are feminist in nature. My analysis suggests that writing center pedagogy invites a disruption
of the confines of a patriarchal system by fostering a contact zone of mutual learning between
consultant and student.
The severe problems of demagoguery and misogyny stem from small-scale perpetuations
of agonistic norms that go unaddressed. I extend the work of rhetorical scholar Patricia RobertsMiller’s work on political demagoguery to that of social media influencers and their cultivation
of micro-scale demagogic norms. I continue Cheryl Glenn’s feminist scholarship about feminine
pedagogical practices to examine how peripheral academic spaces (writing centers) enable
student voices. By using this scholarship, my project argues that educators and tutors can address
the spread of cultural norms that cause large-scale harm by thinking of pedagogy in terms of
aretê for the digital age. Classrooms and writing centers are sites for rhetorical aretê—moral
virtue and excellence in the form of social virtuosity for an agonist, digital age.
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CHAPTER 1
Demagoguery and Rhetorical Media Literacy Pedagogy
On October 12, 2015, before Donald Trump was the official Republican candidate for the
2016 United States Presidential election, he attended a political forum in New Hampshire where
18-year-old college student, Lauren Batchelder, told him that she didn’t think he was “a friend to
women” (Johnson). From what we know of Trump’s online behavior during his tenure as
president, it’s not surprising that the morning following the forum he responded to Batchelder on
his Twitter account. By January 2016, the New York Times found that one in eight posts on
Twitter from Trump “was a personal insult of some kind” (Lee & Quealy). His tweet at 7:39am
on October 13 referred to Batchelder as an “arrogant young woman” and, later at 11:52am, a
second post accused her of being “a ‘plant’ [for Jeb Bush’s campaign] during [his] speech”
(@realDonaldTrump). During the interaction between

Figure 1. Donald Trump tweets
Batchelder and Trump, she said, “So, maybe I’m wrong, maybe you can prove me wrong, but I
don’t think you’re a friend to women” (Johnson). Trump responded, saying he loves, respects,
and cherishes women, to which Batchelder explained what she meant: “If you become president,
will a woman make the same as a man, and do I get to choose what I do with my body?”
(Johnson). “You’re going to make the same if you do as good of a job,” Trump replied, “and I
happen to be pro-life, okay?” (Johnson). This exchange generated media coverage online, which
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lead to Trump’s combative tweets the next morning. Insulting private citizens functions as
weaponized communication—a type of communication that does “not seek to persuade, which
requires consent and mutual openness to persuasion, but to force compliance, which is
acquiescence” (Mercieca 270). Rhetorician Jennifer Mercieca calls this form of communication
“weaponized” because it is a form of violence; in this case, Trump’s tweets directly led to
personal threats of violence.
Mercieca suggests we think of weaponized communication as the widespread use of ad
baculum: a fallacious appeal to threats of force or intimidation that is especially dangerous when
used by a national political leader (271). Trump used his frustration with Republican primary
candidate Jeb Bush as a red herring for Batchelder’s questions, inciting his fan base to go after
Batchelder personally because of her differing political views. What followed were vicious,
salacious messages from Trump supporters to Batchelder’s personal social media accounts.
Trolls commented on her physical appearance, called her names, and threatened rape and other
physical violence via written direct messages, public posts on her Twitter and Facebook pages,
and the creation of memes in her likeness. People stalked her online, found out what university
she was attending, and even her university and home addresses. Her physical and mental safety
were threatened for months after Trump’s tweets were posted. She did not comment publicly
about the incident until over a year later in a Washington Post interview on December 8, 2016
after Trump’s presidential victory.
In the aftermath of the shocking 2016 Presidential election, those who opposed Trump’s
election called for more civic engagement and education as a reaction to Trump’s demagogic
behavior. Rhetorician Patricia Roberts-Miller defines a demagogue as usually a “political leader
who seeks support by appealing to the desires and prejudices of ordinary people rather than by
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using rational argument” (2). Trump’s insulting tweets about Batchelder appealed to a base of his
supporters who routinely gaslight and scapegoat women online as a form of anonymous trolling.
These trolls amp Trump’s message and add to his visibility and salience. When online trolls
attack a woman based on her physical appearance and threaten violence, they are succumbing to
identity-driven discourse that in turn exacerbates a demagogue’s message.
The large-scale demagoguery Trump exhibits—and that which we collectively associate
with notorious modern demagogues like Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini who similarly incited
passion from their political base—are big, loud examples of how demagoguery works in an
identity-driven culture. But large-scale demagoguery is only possible when smaller-scale identity
biases become baked into national and even political discourse. Demagoguery does not have to
be political, just as weaponized communication does not always have to mean threats of physical
violence—both can be local, nuanced, and even banal. Rather than thinking of demagoguery in
terms of the traditional demagogue figure, Roberts-Miller underscores that demagoguery should
“be thought of as a way of participating in public discourse and decision making—a way that can
become the norm in a culture that is profoundly identity-driven” (2). The small-scale
demagoguery that occurs on a daily basis can normalize identity allegiance to a degree that
makes large-scale, grievously consequential demagoguery possible. Rhetorician Collin Gifford
Brooke confirms that “it should therefore serve as no surprise that a wide-spread call for
education has been a persistent theme” since the 2016 election, but this call is not unique in a
time of desperation and upset (123). Demagoguery is not a new concept—it’s ancient.1 Thanks to
the modern digital revolution, however, it is easier than ever to track the increasing appeal of
identity through social media content and interactive behaviors.
1

Athenian general during the Peloponnesian war, Cleon from the 430s B.C. was documented by historian
Thucydides and playwright Aristophanes as a warmongering demagogue.
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This chapter argues that the increasing appeal of demagoguery necessitates a specifically
rhetorical media literacy education in order to expose high school and college students to smallscale demagoguery. The studies of persuasion, media influence, demagoguery, and opinions in
terms of habitual, identity-driven social media practices are vital for thriving in an everexpanding, more aware digital citizenry.

Media Influence and Demagoguery on Social Media
In late 2016, rumblings of a music festival began circulating on social media platforms
that brought influencer culture to the forefront of media literacy conversations. On December 12,
2016, at 5pm., sixty-three influencers posted an orange square to their social media accounts to
endorse the Fyre Music Festival. For people who followed many of these influencers, their
Instagram feeds were peppered with strange orange tiles, with minimal insight into what they
meant. One of the most followed influencers, socialite and model Bella

Figure 2. Bella Hadid Instagram post
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Hadid, wrote, “CANT wait for #FyreFestival Coming soon www.fyrefestival.com” alongside the
orange tile (Hadid). This was a paid advertisement from Fyre promoters through Hadid, a
popular Instagram influencer with millions of followers. My project is not interested in Fyre
Festival because it failed as a music event (the people who attended the event were stranded in
the Bahamas without food, lodging, or transportation, and the organizers of the event exploited
Bahamians for unpaid labor and service, etc). Rather, my project is interested in Fyre Festival’s
media advertising campaign as an example of small-scale demagoguery to anchor pedagogical
rhetorical media literacy. Demagoguery stems from beliefs and perceptions rooted in identity,
and social media platforms provide the ideal space to cultivate an identity-driven echo chamber.
Fyre Festival’s social media campaign leveraged influencers’ charismatic leadership on
Instagram, in effect making them small-scale demagogues.
Social media influencers are therefore purveyors of persuasion. Close reading of the
failed Fyre Festival demonstrates how influencers, no matter how innocuous the product, operate
politically as small-scale demagogues. We traditionally think of demagoguery in terms of the
classic political figurehead persuading the masses—one person standing before thousands to
enact an agenda—but this is not typical of the kind of modern, small-scale demagoguery our
students negotiate every day. Social media platforms are the primary source for how people
consume both entertainment and news, how people interact, influence, and share with others. I
bring social media into the political conversation of demagoguery because social media use and
activity has entered the realm of the political. Social media use, predominantly, is political. The
Pew Research Center published data in 2018 showing two-thirds (68%) of Americans get their
news from social media platforms. The center cited “convenience” as the most commonly
mentioned benefit for social media use (“News Use” Shearer). When 68% of us get our news
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from social media, these social media platforms and influencers with millions of followers are
complicit in politics through forms of demagoguery.
To understand the impact of social media demagoguery, one must understand the
numbers because likes, followers, and impressions online are the currency of social membership.
Fyre Festival garnered over 300 million impressions online within 24 hours and 8,000 tickets
were sold by the date of the event thanks to the high-profile influencers who posted the orange
tile to their Instagram accounts (Bilton). The tickets, which did not include airfare, sold from
$500 to $1500, with VIP packages promising airfare and luxury tent accommodations for
$12,000 (Bilton). But none of the grand plans that Fyre promised were delivered: no luxury
accommodations, not enough food, no musicians were in attendance, and the infrastructure for
the event (toilets, lodgings) was incomplete. At the time of sale, in fact, there were no
photographs of the promised luxury accommodations on the website, just vague sketches—literal
blueprints—with lists of potential amenities. Influencers, however, were paid no less than
$20,000 each for one orange tile post. Their following simply did not ask questions about the
logistics before buying tickets.2 The promoters for the event relied on the cultivated relationship
between influencer and audience to produce actual consumptive revenue for the event.
Suspicion that is usually associated with someone who sells a product is bypassed in an
influencer-follower relationship, shirking the traditional roles between rhetor and audience.
Rhetorician Carolyn Miller explains how traditionally, the relationship between rhetor and
audience is adversarial—that is, trust is not implicit (22). A rhetor succeeds when an audience is
persuaded, but audiences are not easily won over in the traditional context of rhetor speaking

2

Kendall Jenner, the most followed influencer of the group, collected a $250,000 fee for making her post about a
month after the original sea of orange tiles.
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before an audience. In On Rhetoric, Aristotle explains, “authors should compose without being
noticed” in order to temper suspicion from the audience (3.2.4). By keeping an agenda or need
from an audience concealed, the rhetor hides their true intention in order to appear authentic and
sincere to their audience. This concealment, ironically, builds trust between the rhetor and
audience. When an audience feels like someone wants something from them, they are less likely
to trust what is being said, giving way to suspicion. Suspicion causes an audience to question the
motives and character of the rhetor, sparking a refusal to trust—leaving the rhetor unconcealed.
When we watch someone give a speech, the dynamic of the relationship positions an audience
member as an observer. This relationship is different on social media platforms because the
platforms can give an illusion of participation. Liking a post, reposting a post, and following
people feels active, participatory. This is where students—and most social media consumers—
may begin to feel confused about the types of relationships they cultivate on platforms where
users cultivate followings.
Think of the Insta-influencer as the rhetor, the persuasive force trying to win over an
audience. Just like political rhetors, influencers have to build trust in order to retain their
following and ultimately their ability to commodify their following. To avoid audience-follower
suspicion, the influencer shares personal stories, glimpses of their life, invites the audience in to
what would otherwise be a concealed world. The idea of inviting someone in invokes RobertsMiller’s dissection of public disagreement, which she says, “concerns three stases: group
identity…, need…, and what level of punishment to enact against the out group” (“Democracy”
33). The “group identity” stasis concerns “who is in the in-group, what signifies out-group
membership, and how loyal rhetors are to the in-group” ( 33). By inviting followers in to their ingroup, the influencer seems to give access to their world. Different types of images can make up
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an influencer’s world-building, giving an allusion of access: old family photos and selfies
alongside sponsored advertising and political promotion (see Figure 3). These images and
captions create an appearance of sincerity and openness. Such posts, however, are signifiers of
an in-group identity where the influencer is the charismatic leader of a picture-perfect echo
chamber.

Figure 3. Kendall Jenner Instagram screen capture from Feb. 2016
A charismatic leader, a being perceived as almost magical, becomes a proxy for the
follower’s self—that is, followers of a charismatic leader see themselves in the leader. In extreme
situations of demagoguery, criticism of a charismatic leader is taken personally by the followers.
Just as it’s nearly impossible to see oneself as a bad person, it can become inconceivable for a
follower to see the leader as bad. Patricia Roberts-Miller identifies charismatic leaders as having
four unique characteristics: they are perceived as superhuman; followers blindly believe leader’s
statements; followers unconditionally comply with leaders’ directives for action (whether
explicit or implied); and followers give the leader an unqualified emotional commitment
(“Rhetoric” 60). As an influencer, Kendall Jenner documents an ideal reality that her followers
aspire to inhabit. Her leadership is defined by consumerism—that is, by owning the things Jenner
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owns, the follower can be like her, can have some of her charisma, can attain some of her magic.
Audiences turn to influencers like Kendall Jenner (see Figure 4), for advice on everything from
over-the-knee boots, “one of my favorites,” she writes, to facial cleansing routines, “because
every once in a while you have to slow down” (“One;” “Because”). I’m your friend, these posts
imply, you can be like me by buying these shoes or imitating my hygiene routine. Follower
loyalty is demonstrated through likes, reposts, and purchases.

Figure 4. Kendall Jenner Instagram screen captures from 2019
Follower loyalty is such a normalized part of social media infrastructure that the act of
liking, reposting, and clicking links to people’s websites may not even be thought about in the
moment. The urge to click the like button is as innate as any other real-life reaction. When my
friend makes a corny joke, it’s impossible for me to do anything other than roll my eyes. This
reaction is not something I think about, but something that happens instantaneously. As someone
scrolls through Instagram or Twitter feeds, clicking the like or reposts buttons are just as
spontaneous. These examples contribute to the persuasive power of the rhetor. Gut-reactions,
that is liking a post without really considering it, is reactionary rather than actively participatory.
Usually this is innocuous, but think about when a politician like Donald Trump retweeted three
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inflammatory and unverified anti-Muslim videos from Britain First, a far-right British
organization. His retweets increased Islamophobic commentary on social media and elevated the
profile of the previously fringe group of anti-Muslim activists. When asked about the retweets in
January 2018 in an interview with Piers Morgan for Good Morning Britain, Trump said he knew
“nothing about [Britain First] today other than I read a little bit” and if Morgan would like
Trump to apologize he “would certainly apologize if you’d like [him] to do that” (Sharman).
Though an extreme example of reacting on social media, public reactions on Twitter can give
voice and legitimacy to groups or people even if you know nothing about them beyond their
social media presence.
Persuasion that incites in-group, out-group binaries positions demagoguery as “a savvy
rhetorical strategy” (Roberts-Miller “Democracy” 4). Pitting one group against another—
scapegoating one group as the problems of another—becomes normal within demagogic
discourse. Demagoguery is viral, spreading conditions of binaries and identity logics that are
harmful to constructive conversation. There is little room for open-minded dialogue when
identity matters more than anything else, as we can see with social media followings. The
average Instagram user selects the accounts they choose to follow based on characteristics
related to identity—whether it is an accurate reflection of one’s identity or aspirational. By
following a certain account, users invite the ethos of that person into their life, allowing
influence.
Demagoguery frequently occurs on this kind of small scale, but small-scale demagoguery
can lead to larger, more insidious effects that cause harm. Small-scale demagoguery is what our
students interact with the most, causing demagoguery to feel normal in these micro-moments.
For example, choosing who to follow and who not to follow results in a curated echo chamber of
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identity reinforcement. Inciting in-group favoritism is a form of the genetic fallacy appeal where
people of an in-group are considered trustworthy without merit. As Roberts-Miller explains,
“social group membership suffices as proof” of authenticity (“Democracy” 37). Rather than
trying to convince people to attend their festival through traditional means, Fyre sought to reach
their audience by leveraging in-group bias and the fear of missing out (FoMO), “a pervasive
apprehension that others might be having rewarding experiences from which one is absent”
(Przybylski et. al 1844). Because the marketing campaign for Fyre relied on the clout of dozens
of influencers, deemed “Fyre Starters,” the festival did not have to earn the trust of the people
they hoped to sell tickets to—they bypassed this part of sales to leverage the trust of the
influencer’s network.
Influencers become intimately known by their following and their interests bleed through
the photos and captions. Kendall Jenner’s influencer posts are a mix of sponsorship and
supposed insight into their real life. In 2016, Jenner even used her platform to endorse Hillary
Clinton, first in February 2016 while also promoting both Marc Jacobs and Vogue

Jenner post February 18, 2016

Jenner post November 7, 2016

Figure 5. Kendall Jenner Instagram posts from 2016
Magazine, and then a second time on November 7th, 2016, with the caption “her her her her”
(Jenner “Her”). This post was not only the day before the election, but just two months before
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Figure 6. Page from Fyre Festival Promotion deck
her Fyre Festival Instagram post on January 5, 2017. These posts collectively demonstrate how
social media influence operates via demagogic logics—when a sponsored post for clothing or a
music festival solidifies in-group membership just as much as a post of political support. This
strategy is not dissimilar to how political influence propagates on social media platforms, as
evidenced in the rhetoric of Jenner’s Hillary Clinton posts: if you trust Kendall Jenner, if you are
in her in-group, then vote for Hillary Clinton. It’s a demagogic enthymeme for our digital age.
Influencers bypass suspicion, not through classical means of seemingly spontaneous
speeches, but through cultivated sincerity. Regarding persuasion, rhetorician Bryan Garsten
articulates that “when we persuade, we want to change our listeners’ minds by linking our
position to their existing opinions and emotions”—in short, we want to show our audience that
we are on the same side, that we are a part of the same in-group (2). The easiest way to do this is
to build friendship. Even Aristotle lauded the significant bonds of friendship, claiming that
“when people are friends, they have no need of justice” (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.1.1155a). That
is to say, trust exists within friendship, implicitly. A dialogue between friends does not involve
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suspicion because trust has been formed over time. Politically speaking, friends do not need to
win each other over or reinforce their in-group status since these are inherent to the friendship.
Illusory friendship conceals the mechanisms of all forms of persuasion.
Teachers of rhetoric can use the concealment of persuasion as an educational tool.
Rhetorical media literacy pedagogy amplifies the unconcealment of demagogic conditions.
Miller suggests a
solution requires the unconcealment of rhetoric, the naming of the tools. Indeed,
rhetorical education, rhetorica docens in the scholastic tradition, makes visible
our rhetorical practice, rhetorica utens, by naming, analysis, imitation… this
knowledge will make for citizens who can both listen critically and speak and
write effectively… If citizens become more critical judges of rhetorical practice,
they should also become more cunning practitioners themselves. (31-2).
We “must name the tools” to enable audience awareness—students’ awareness—of persuasive
practices in media and digital media (32). By calling for an unconcealment of rhetorical
strategies in the classroom, Miller rightly says student-citizens will become more “cunning
practitioners themselves,” and by illuminating the practice, a more critically attuned citizenaudience will emerge (31). When persuading, rhetoric functions best concealed—it is easier to
persuade someone who trusts without suspicion, as we saw with the Fyre promotions.
Pedagogically, however, rhetoric is an analytic tool of unconcealment—by teaching students and
citizens how to engage with media from a place of rhetorical understanding, the audience can
make more concrete choices to trust or refuse anyone who seeks to commodify their relationship.
A refusal to trust, through influencer or demagogue, denies both influence and power, leveling
the dynamic between audience and rhetor or follower and influencer.
Media influence is a part of the Communication strand of Virginia’s eleventh grade
English standards of learning: students will “examine how values and points of view are included
or excluded and how media influences beliefs and behaviors” (“SOL 11.2” 271). Since the small-
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scale moments like influencer advertisements are what students most frequently interact with on
social media, the Fyre Festival as a cultural moment can be used in the classroom to help
students recognize how media messages influence audience behaviors. Presented as a case study
to evaluate source materials, the small-scale demagoguery of social media persuasion helps to
determine authorial purpose and intended effects on an audience. With the concepts covered in
this section, there is room to look closely at media literacy education in Virginia secondary
English education.

Oral Language to Communications in the Virginia Standards of Learning3
In June 1995, the Virginia Department of Education (VDOE) approved the Standards of
Learning in four core content areas: mathematics, science, English, and history & social
sciences. The SOLs are unique in that the state of Virginia is one of only nine states in the US
that does not use the Common Core State Standards (CCSS) initiative. In 2010, when CCSS was
dispersed nationwide, Virginia had already been using the SOL system for fifteen years. After
reviewing and comparing both systems, the VDOE found the considerable time and money
invested in developing the SOLs did not warrant a switch to a comparable system of state
education standards.
In general, the state of Virginia believes their SOLs are more comprehensive than the
CCSS wherein students will “have been exposed to the same content [as CCSS] through different
learning progressions, although there is some content in the SOL that is not covered in the
CCSS” (“Comparison” 4). For the English SOLs there are different strands, or categories, that
teachers focus on throughout the year. For kindergarten through 3rd grade there are three English

3

I received my teaching licensure in Virginia and have taught in Virginia public schools using the SOLs, so my
focus is on Virginia’s SOLs for the purposes of this project.
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SOL strands: 1) Oral Language, 2) Reading, 3) Writing. For fourth grade through twelfth grade
there are four English SOL strands: 1) Communication: Speaking, Listening, Media Literacy, 2)
Reading, 3) Writing, 4) Research (“English Standards”). Beginning in fourth grade for the SOLs,
the Oral Language strand changes to Communication: Speaking, Listening, and Media Literacy,
giving communication skills its own focus through the remainder of a student’s public education.
This is a notable distinction between the SOLs and CCSS because CCSS addresses media
literacy as an application within the standards and does not give the subject its own emphasis.
The VDOE does not state exactly why the shift from Oral Language in kindergarten
through third grade to Communication in fourth grade occurs, though it may have to do with
developmental psychologist Jean Piaget’s stages of cognitive development. From ages seven to
nine, depending on personal development, children move from Piaget’s preoperational stage
(generally marked as ages 2-7/8) to the concrete operational stage (generally marked as ages 8/911) of cognitive development. In the preoperational stage, ending sometime during third grade,
Piaget suggests children are limited by egocentrism, the tendency to “perceive, understand, and
interpret the world in terms of the self,” meaning they are not yet able to understand the
perspective of others (Miller 53 qtd in Meece & Daniels). Further, children in the preoperational
stage begin to develop an understanding of their own mind, but have limited understanding of
thinking processes (Meece & Daniels 142). Looking closely at the SOL standard for third grade,
there are five standards that designate success: attentive listening, ask and respond to questions,
explain what has been learned, use contextual language, and increase vocabulary to talk about
listening and speaking.4 These Oral Language communication skills all fall within Piaget’s
preoperational stage in which students are not yet expected to think beyond themselves or

4

For a detailed look at the third (3.1) and fourth (4.1) grade SOLs that I discuss in this section, see Figure 1 in the
appendix.

22

consider different perspectives from their own. Piaget’s theories combine well with the
hierarchical model used to classify cognitive educational learning objectives developed by
Benjamin Bloom, published in 1956 (Meece & Daniels 214). The hierarchy has six distinct
stages that become progressively more cognitively demanding: remember→ understand→
apply→ analyze→ evaluate→ create. The understand stage asks students to explain ideas or
concepts through description, discussion, explanation, and identification. The third grade SOLs
for Oral Language fall within this understand stage of Bloom’s Taxonomy in that students’
primary cognitive role is to explain, summarize, and identify what has been said.
In fourth grade, educators in Virginia public schools are tasked with introducing a new
strand of learning: Communication: Speaking, Listening, Media Literacy—the beginning of
rhetorical education. The difference between what they do in this strand in fourth grade
compared with the Oral Language strand done in kindergarten through third grade falls in line
with what is known as metacognitive development in child psychology. Metacognition is
thinking about thinking, or awareness of one’s own theories and opinions (Meece & Daniels
144). This type of language is reflected in the fourth grade communication SOL, showing vastly
different language than the previous grade’s Oral Language strand: “seek ideas and opinions of
others, use evidence to support opinions” (“English Standards” 74). 5 Expanding the oral
language strand to a more detailed understanding of communication by including media literacy
challenges students to grow from the preoperational stage of cognitive development to Piaget’s
concrete operational stage.
The fourth grade standards ask students to present information, contribute to discussions,
seek the opinions of others, use evidence to support opinions, communicate new ideas, and

5

Refer to Figure 1 with special attention to the language of the 4.1 standards
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demonstrate abilities to work both collaboratively and independently, all of which coincide with
moving through Bloom’s Taxonomy. In the communication strand, students enter new stages of
cognitive development and begin honing skills that will help them form opinions and
perspectives on their way to adulthood. Not just asked to understand what is being said, students
must apply information they learn to new situations by interpreting opinions and ideas of other
people. Students analyze by drawing connections among new ideas through questioning, and
they evaluate by justifying a stance in support of an opinion by using evidence. Students then
create new or original work through synthesizing their opinions and evidence to develop into
presentations and contributions to discussions (Meece & Daniels 224). The addition of the
communications strand moves students from basic cognitive development to more advanced
critical thinking skills for the rest of their education.
As students progress to middle school (grades 6-8), the Communication strand is divided
into three parts: communication and collaboration with others (6.1, 7.1, 8.1), present, listen
critically, and express opinions in oral presentations (6.2, 7.2, 8.2), and understanding elements
of media literacy (6.3,7.3, 8.3) (“English Standards” 141, 142, 143, 166, 167, 168, 193, 194,
195). The three divisions progressively building upon the skills honed from the year before,
spanning from sixth to seventh to eighth grades. In high school, though, the strand focuses on
two areas per grade: 9th grade—oral presentations and media messages, 10th grade—
collaboration and media messages, 11th grade—oral presentations and media influence, 12th
grade—oral presentations (group or individual) and media influence (“English Standards” 220,
223, 247, 248, 268, 271). Common to all grade levels from fourth grade onward is the critical
role opinions, influence, and media play in daily life. Despite the scope of the Communication
strand, the actual teaching and implementing of media literacy in the curriculum is up to each
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teacher. The English SOL tests do not occur every year and only explicitly cover the Reading
and Writing strands, leaving the Communication strand out completely. Students take the reading
SOL exam in grades 3-8 and grade 11, and they take the writing SOL in grades 8 and 11. The
choice to include the Communications strand as a part of the yearly curriculum falls on
individual teachers within individual departments of individual schools, but I argue it is an
ethical choice that teachers and department administrators must make. In an ever-increasing
digital world, media literacy can no longer be seen as separate from reading and writing literacy.

Pedagogical Ethics and Knowing Students
As teachers, the ethical obligation to our students is not to tell them what to think or
believe, but to help “students develop an ethical approach for making decisions about how to
believe” (Glenn 137). This reminder from rhetorician Cheryl Glenn is especially important as the
communications strand in Virginia’s English standards of learning (SOLs) evolves from fourth
grade through middle and high school. In sixth grade, the SOL states that students “will express
personal opinions and come to understand not only differing points of view but also the
differences between facts and opinions” (“English Standards” 140). The distinction between
facts and opinions is one that we see debated ad nauseum on news channels or through political
Twitter posts. These types of communication skills are a part of daily life in a technological
world for people who are learning to not only discern between the two, but also develop their
own opinions.
Within the formulation of opinions and perspectives, an educator’s ethical obligation
takes root. As English teachers of communication and writing, “we are always already engaged
in the teaching of rhetorical ethics and that the teaching of writing necessarily and inevitably
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moves us into ethical reflections and decision-making” (Duffy 230, emphasis Duffy’s). In the
fourth grade, when students start learning to identify their own opinions and the opinions of other
people, bias begins to form. These opinions shape who our students are and how they perceive
the world. As students learn to put their opinions together for the act of writing they are actively
parsing their own ethical orientations. Developing an ethical attunement is a part of a student’s
path to aretê.
The path to aretê, known as excellence or virtue, is done with help from a teacher or
tutor, though the relationship today between teacher and student differs from the original
intentions of aretê in Ancient Greece. Socrates tutored Plato, and Plato tutored Aristotle, but in
modern society one teacher is charged with anywhere from fifteen to thirty students in a single
classroom. Class-size, along with people’s varying experiences with technology, do not always
guarantee that enough time is appropriately allocated to the communication strand of the English
SOL, let alone media literacies. In high school, where students “develop media literacy by
examining how media messages influence people’s beliefs and behaviors,” the way media
influence is taught and the amount of time that is given to the subject is ultimately determined by
the teacher (“English Standards” 294). This is true of any SOL strand in any classroom. Teachers
must feel it as an important literacy component of the curriculum to dedicate time to its study.
Media literacy is listed as the first strand of the English SOLs for a reason: nearly all
interactions with friends, family, news, consumption, and even education involve elements of
digital media. That is to say, digital media use feels completely normal in 2020. Despite this
normalcy, in some contexts digital media use is seen as a mere distraction—particularly in the
classroom where teachers are fighting for their student’s attention. However, the English SOLs
in particular allow for digital media use to be at the forefront of classroom dialogue. By
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embracing and centering changes in textual consumption in an English classroom, educators are
making an ethical commitment to include media literacy frameworks as integral pieces of a
curriculum. Educational theorist Lee Shulman elaborates on the professional responsibility
teachers have for what their students learn:
My point is that excellent teaching… entails an ethical and moral commitment— what I
might call the “pedagogical imperative.” Teachers with this kind of integrity feel an
obligation to . . . inquire into the consequences of their work with students. (Shulman).
There are ethical implications for excluding media literacy. Take online bullying as an
example—in 2017, Harvard admissions revoked ten offers of acceptance for students who
participated in sending each other offensive and explicit memes (Natanson). Memes are not just
“for fun,” but can expose the ethos of the person sending the images—the meme is a proxy for
how the sender feels and thinks about a subject. The people held accountable for the racist and
sexually explicit memes were not the creators, but the propagators. Memes are a new form of
text that carry weight and real-life consequences for pedagogical aretê. For the journey toward
excellence in English education to be successful, teachers must understand how and with what
forms of digital media students are interfacing.
Getting to know students is therefore an integral part of media education. While going to
university tends to be a choice, attending K-12 schooling is compulsory for most students—they
have to be there. Knowledge about students’ cultural background and digital literacy is a
necessary condition for achieving aretê in terms of rhetorical media literacy. We don’t know, for
example, who is getting enough food each day, who has a place to sleep at night, who wrote a
#MeToo post, and the list goes on. To think intersectionally about students is to reveal “the
multiplicity of positions that coexist in any classroom” (Glenn 131).
Conclusion
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Duffy asks English educators to define teaching argument “as the teaching of claims,
proofs, and counterarguments, [where] we are necessarily and inevitably engaged . . . in
practices of ethical deliberation” (238). Claims, he suggests, are invitations to make sense of
something: proofs ask students to hold themselves accountable to providing evidence.
Additionally, when we teach students to include counterarguments they are “considering
seriously opinions, facts or values that contradict their own, . . . we are asking students to inhabit
the perspective of The Other and to open themselves to the doubts and contradictions that attach
to any worthwhile question” (238). Argument and research papers essentially ask students to
persuade within a set of evolving ethical parameters. Facilitating situations where students are
asked to focus on the validity of claims, the accountability of proofs, while demonstrating
empathy and open-mindedness in counterarguments guides students to consider the ethics of
their persuasion. By giving them the tools to understand how ethics are a part of good, sound
argumentation, students will be able to notice when others are not following the same guidelines
or even if they themselves are being misled.
At the beginning of this chapter I recounted the story of Lauren Batchelder, Donald
Trump, and the harm that can come from weaponized communication. Since his medium of
choice is Twitter, Trump weaponizes the affordances of social media platforms to enact his
verbal violence. The adage “sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt
me,” contrasts the harm children would experience with physical violence with the effects of
verbal violence, in hopes to minimize the effects of language (Gerdes 14). Rhetorician Kendall
Gerdes underscores that “words—and images, and symbols—can and do hurt;” indeed,
weaponized communication can lead to real life threats and harm (14). An implied benefit of
teaching towards aretê and ethical rhetoric is that students will become used to being held
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accountable for the things they say while encouraged to consider differing points of view.
Naming the tools, as Miller suggests, involves knowing the types of fallacious appeals that
weaponized communication rely upon. Naming the tools can make it easier to hold these types of
leaders, dynamics, and systems accountable. Encouraging students to seriously consider
counterarguments and points of view from which they are not familiar creates at best impartial
and observant citizens, and at worst it teaches students to be receptive and amenable to ideas
other than their own.
A call to action for more media education as a response to demagoguery or prevailing
politics is not new, but there is an urgency to understand how demagoguery functions differently
as we get deeper into the twenty-first century than it did even thirty years ago. The small-scale
demagoguery that has come to characterize digital landscapes is new territory in the US because
digital citizenship on social media networks are relatively new territory considering Myspace,
LinkedIn, Friendster (now defunct) began in 2003, Facebook in 2004, Twitter in 2006, Instagram
in 2010, Snapchat in 2011, TikTok in 2016, with more on the horizon. A rhetorical media
literacy pedagogy responds to the social media enclaves of identity-driven discourse that occur
naturally within such online platforms. Preparing younger generations of students to think about
digital spaces in critical and rhetorically sensitives ways is necessary for achieving aretê in 2020.

29

CHAPTER 2
Misogyny and Rhetorical Listening in Writing Center Pedagogy
In an online article for Vox during the 2016 presidential election campaign, journalist
Ezra Klein sought to uncover what he calls “the Gap” in Hillary Clinton’s campaign. “The Gap,”
he explains, is the disconnect between: 1) the people who work or have worked for Clinton, 2)
their absolute trust, admiration, and loyalty to her, 3) the people who have to vote her into office,
their distrust, uncertainty, and dislike of her. Klein interviewed dozens of current and former
Clinton “staffers, colleagues, friends, and foes” by beginning each discussion with roughly the
same question: “What is true about the Hillary Clinton you’ve worked with that doesn’t come
through on the campaign trail?” (Klein). Outwardly, this seems like a difficult question to
respond to—if the answer was clear, then wouldn’t there be a way to overcome this invisible
disconnect? But the answers Klein received were consistent and simple: “she really listens to
you” (Klein). She listens.
As a line of inquiry or subfield within rhetoric and composition studies, listening is rarely
explicitly taught or even theorized. English exams and standardized tests focus on reading and
writing, described by rhetorician Krista Ratcliffe as “the dominant tropes for interpretive
invention,” with speaking placing “a respectable third” and listening running “a poor, poor
fourth” (Rhetorical Listening 18). Treating reading and writing as dominant tropes disregards the
importance of listening in rhetoric and composition classrooms. Rhetorical listening is, in fact, “a
trope for interpretive invention” because it initiates a stance of openness to listen for potential
identification movement among any cultural category (age, class, nationality, history, religion,
politics) or any cultural position (parent/child, patient/doctor, clergy/parishioner, teacher/student)
(17). However, Clinton’s penchant for listening, for being known by her peers, allies, and even
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enemies as an adept listener, did not garner accolades from the public. Her openness,
characterized by her listening, was neither seen nor heard when the time came to vote her into
presidential office in 2016.
Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump in 2016 was in part due to a majority 47% of white
women who voted for Trump instead of Clinton (43%) despite his “long history of misogyny,
sexual assault, and harassment” (Pew Research Center; Manne 15).1 Philosopher Kate Manne
suggests white women actually prop up the misogyny of the most powerful white men, which
does “disproportionate damage of one kind: moral damage” (15). Manne’s explanation of
misogyny begins with white men and women because it feeds directly into the moral problems of
misogyny faced by more vulnerable women—those of other races, trans, and otherwise less
privileged (15). To understand the function of misogyny that does moral damage, Manne gives
an apt distinction between two definitions of misogyny. The first, what she calls the “naïve
conception,” is a dictionary-definition-style understanding of the concept wherein “misogyny is
primarily a property of individual misogynists who are prone to hate women qua women… either
universally or generally” (18). In this definition, misogynists fit a specific psychological profile
of bigotry. For the second, Manne explains that misogyny should be understood as the “system
that operates within a patriarchal social order to police and enforce women’s subordination and
to uphold male dominance” (33). Misogyny is not isolated to any one person, but is rather a
“political phenomenon” of a culture that remains ideologically patriarchal (33). In other words,
Clinton’s loss in 2016 points to the deep-rooted patriarchy of the U.S. electorate.
Clinton’s approach to political candidacy has been noticeably different from that of any

1

Immediately following the 2016 election, many exit polls (NYTimes, CNN) cited the white woman vote for Trump
as 52-53%, an overwhelming majority. This was the narrative at the time of Manne’s writing published in December
2017. The Pew Research Center released a more comprehensive analysis in August 2018, clarifying the numbers to
reflect a more accurate validated voter profile post-2016 election.
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other in the national spotlight. In 1999, during her campaign for the New York state senate, she
went on what she called a listening tour. She did this again during the 2016 campaign. These
tours were not the Town Hall political showcases we typically see from male presidential
candidates because Clinton took notes and listened to the concerns of the people she hoped to
represent. By listening, she was able to take action—invention occurred because she listened
and, by association, was silent, allowing for others to take up space. Listening and silence work
in tandem, and as such both have “long been gendered ‘feminine,’ as a lamentable essence of
weakness because speaking out has long been the gendered signal of masculinity” (Glenn Silence
and Listening 4). Clinton’s behavior did not fit into the presidential mold because of her
distinctly feminine approach to the presidential race, which was sharply different from her male
opponent.
The responsibility to listen or be silent is an expectation for women, but when the
expectation is performed on a national scale for a job of prestige and power (the presidency), the
expectation is questioned. The Gap that Klein refers to, where one side sees Clinton’s listening
as a positive and the other perceives it as if Clinton has something to hide, exposes a cultural and
gendered double standard, which rhetorician Cheryl Glenn troubles by claiming that silence can
actually “be a deliberative, positive choice” (Glenn Rhetorical Feminism 172). Silence can create
space for others to join a conversation, just as rhetorical listening can lead to action. But listening
and silence are weighted with cultural gender norms, particularly feminine norms of
attentiveness where women are expected to listen or be silent as decorum. According to Manne,
there are norms of feminine attentiveness: “when women are supposed to give everyone around
them personal care and attention, or else they risk seeming nasty, mean, unfair, and callus” (266).
These norms are rampant in public discourse perceptions—men and women are perceived
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fundamentally differently according to associations of responsibilities. Essentially, a woman’s
responsibility is to be attentive, otherwise there are social consequences. The paradox with
Clinton occurs because she both listens and acts—her rhetorical listening approach leads to
action in the male-centered patriarchal stratum of government. This paradox, in turn, causes
suspicion.
If a male candidate is seen listening in a position of openness, “his behavior seems
normal, unremarkable, business as usual,” but the same does not hold true for female
candidates—“her doing the same thing makes us wonder: what is she hiding?” (Manne 270).
Manne points out that the gendered split perception of behavior works on a national scale. When
reading about Clinton’s approach to campaigning, it is hard not to scoff at the idea of listening as
something unique to a female candidate. Don’t all candidates listen to their constituency? In U.S.
culture, however, “speaking is gendered as masculine and valued positively in a public forum
while listening is gendered as feminine and valued negatively” (Ratcliffe 18). The type of
listening used in political spaces is the style of listening Ratcliff characterizes as masculine: a
listening “by challenging speakers to a verbal duel to determine who knows more and who is
quicker on his feet” (21). Women, however, are conditioned to listen differently “by smiling
nodding, asking questions, and providing encouraging verbal cues (yes, uh huh, is that right?,
hmmm) (Ratcliffe 21). Thus, a woman’s style of listening, particularly on a national level, is
considered suspicious because it is not directly antagonistic. Clinton engaged in the verbal
sparring performance during debates, but she took a different approach of rhetorical listening
during her individual tours.
For Hillary Clinton, the exigence for her listening tours was to create new, helpful
policies by listening with intentional openness to her constituents. Laurie Rubiner, Clinton’s
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legislative director from 2005 to 2008, told Klein of a time she was asked to block out two hours
on the calendar for “card-table time.” Alongside two card tables, two huge suitcases were opened
to reveal newspaper clippings, position papers, and random scraps. On her tours and travels,
Clinton stuffed notes from her conversations and readings into the suitcases to be organized and
picked through with her staff every few months. According to Rubiner, these notes “really did
lead to legislation” because she took these conversations seriously and made her team follow up
(Klein). Clinton’s campaign to fight opiate addiction, for example, the first and most
comprehensive of the candidates in the 2016 presidential campaign, was the direct result of
hearing about the issue on her tour (Klein). By listening rhetorically with openness to Other
identities, Clinton enacted interpretive invention through legislative moves.
Rhetorical listening is a feminist approach to leadership and mentoring, one that combats
misogyny head on by denying force, prioritizing other points of view, and demonstrating care.
Rhetorical listening rebuffs the persistence of misogynist interactions and hierarchy. Like
demagoguery, misogyny functions on an everyday level that is impactful on a global scale.
Through the ongoing threat of various types of punishment, misogyny operates implicitly
through gendered perceptions and expectations for feminine performances. Such implicit
preservations of misogyny normalize the internalization of misogyny, leading to serious damage.
In the sections that follow, I craft the arete necessary to address the insidious and widespread
nature of contemporary misogyny. I craft this arete by drawing from what writing centers can
teach us about feminist spaces, mentoring, and feminine styles of rhetorical listening.

Feminist Aretȇ
In the introduction, I discussed the concept of aretȇ in Homer’s Iliad where Achilles was
trained by Chiron and Phoenix—here, through Homer, the mythos of mentoring began. He
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continues his exposition of mentoring in his second epic, Odyssey, where a woman, the Greek
goddess Athena, serves as the original model for mentoring as we know it in practice today.
Athena, goddess of both wisdom and warfare, transforms herself into Mentor, a close and trusted
friend to Odysseus. During her transformation, she advises Odysseus’ son, Telemachus, to set
out on a quest to find his long-missing father. Athena-as-Mentor instructs Telemachus on whom
to meet, where to go, what to say, and how to behave during his quest. Through Athena-asMentor, the concept of mentorship and mentoring took root. This feminine version of the origins
of mentorship differs from the long tradition of the master-apprentice model that was used for
ages by men. Patriarchal mentoring was rooted in the service of the state for warfare and later in
service of the self through philosophical and rhetorical education. But the concept of mentorship
has its origins in Athena-as-Mentor, a woman.
In other words, the quest and journey towards aretȇ was shaped by a feminine mythos. I
want to posit, then, that using a specifically feminist rhetorical pedagogy can reclaim mentorship
towards arete as a feminine style of practice. Feminist rhetorician Cheryl Glenn itemizes three
specific ways to enact feminist mentoring as a tactic of rhetorical feminism. The first is for the
mentor to actively “diverge from masculinist forms of mentoring,” the second is for the mentor
to acknowledge that she resides in the center, the mentee in the margins, and the third is for the
mentor to create the basis for a “mutually trusting relationship” with the mentee (150). These
three feminist mentoring tenants can produce arete in pedagogical contexts that continue to be
limited by a white, masculinist hegemony—one that we can actively witness during national
campaigns.
Nowhere is it more clear that misogyny and patriarchal expectations reign than during
election seasons. To return to the example of Hillary Clinton, just why exactly was Ezra Klein’s
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article for Vox needed in the first place? Why did the public, or at least Vox’s readership, need to
be told about Clinton’s practice of listening and the benefits of listening? The ‘question’ of her
likability was all news headlines seemed to be interested in leading up to the election. A quick
Google search showed headlines from The Hill, December 2015, “Is Hillary Clinton Likable
Enough,” from The Washington Post, May 2016, “Hillary Clinton has a likability problem.
Donald Trump has a likability epidemic;” and from Time, May 2016, “Is Hillary Clinton Likable
Enough?” (Parnes; Cillizza; Newton-Small). The same types of headlines followed Elizabeth
Warren during her primary campaign: from Politico, December 2018, “Warren Battles the
Ghosts of Hillary” and from Vox, January 2019, referencing both Warren and Kamala Harris,
“‘Likability’ Ratings in a Recent New Hampshire Poll Show Just How Tough Female
Candidates Have It” (Korecki, Nilsen).
Female candidates are always already a threat to misogynistic systems. By choosing to
approach campaigning from a stance of rhetorical listening, for instance, Hillary Clinton defied
the masculinist forms of campaign structure. If we look at Clinton as a mentor, she fulfilled all
three methods of Glenn’s rhetorical feminist approach by actively “diverg[ing] from masculinist
forms of mentoring” and carving her own, lateral approach to campaigning. By centering
rhetorical listening practices, she acknowledged that her influence and power place her in the
center with her constituency at the margins. Listening creates an openness that equalizes. That is,
by showing interest and concern towards her constituency, she did not create a hierarchical
structure that placed her at the top, but rather created a level, equal means of communication.
Finally, by implementing rhetorical listening practices, Clinton was able to amplify the voices of
her constituency. Card-table time allowed Clinton to move through her notes and create a plan of
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action that would lead to tangible outcomes. In these ways, Clinton’s feminine style of leadership
actively combats large-scale misogynist influence.
Just as Hillary Clinton’s use of rhetorical listening is her way of combating misogynist
norms, so, too, can a rhetorical feminist pedagogy empower educators to combat the patriarchal
and misogynist norms that might otherwise impede a student’s quests for aretȇ. In a digital age
where media perpetuates stereotypes, a feminist mentoring methodology can work in the service
of individual student aretȇ. Indeed, addressing micro forms of misogyny and patriarchal control
leads to bigger, large-scale effects in a digital consciousness.
In Chapter 1, I used large-scale forms of demagoguery to demonstrate an extreme, but
the chapter essentially focused on how smaller forms of demagoguery normalize the structures
that make large-scale demagoguery possible. Here in Chapter 2, I follow a similar structure. I
identify the extreme of misogyny by beginning with the example of Hillary Clinton’s use of
rhetorical listening to combat political misogyny on a large-scale. What follows is a foray into
how feminist rhetorical practices can combat more innocuous forms of patriarchal and
misogynist control. I extend Cheryl Glenn’s work on rhetorical feminism and mentorship to
claim the writing center as a feminist space on a university campus, up against small-scale
misogynist standard language ideology within the academy. As an outlier space, the writing
center combats forms of restraint within academic language, and subsequently writing, that
students are up against in university settings. Through feminist practices of mentorship and
rhetorical listening the writing center becomes a refuge during a student’s quest for arete.

Standard Language Ideology
Status quo bias is a preference for normalcy, the way things are, the current state of
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activity. For someone with a status quo bias, the baseline of status quo is their reference point
and difference from that baseline is a loss. This bias can affect small and large-scale decision
making because it relies on a preference for things to stay the same or for standing by previously
made choices that have worked in the past. Largely, the status quo feels safe and comfortable
because it is popular, safe, and known, whereas deterrents to the status quo are considered
disruptive outliers. In education, teachers often teach towards the status quo because past
experiences shape teachers’ views of what constitutes good teaching. A fixture in educational
status quo bias is standard language ideology (SLI):
a bias toward an abstracted, idealized, homogenous spoken language which is imposed
and maintained by dominant bloc institutions and which names as its model the written
language but which is drawn primarily from the spoken language of the upper middle
class (Lippi-Green 67).
Language ideologies in education are formed and influenced by positioning the language of
high-level education as a more advanced, complex version of English. For teachers of language,
relying on the status quo for consistency is the safe, comfortable choice because SLI is an
inherent part of the American mainstream—it is what is spoken on the news, radio, and
television, within political, educational, professional settings. Standard language ideology has
become the default status quo for how to speak as an American.
Standardized English and the idea of a standard language ideology represent a very
specific and exclusive sector of the population. For my purposes, SLI is the language of the
academy and associated with certain types of success. Not only is SLI the norm, but academic
institutions also maintain the notion that a standard the only acceptable norm for writing in an
academic setting. In academic settings that claim to welcome diversity in student population,
there is a noticeable disconnect when considering standard language ideology in the academy
and expectations for academic writing.
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The patriarchal approach to academic writing within university and academic settings
aligns with Manne’s definition of misogyny as a function of patriarchal social order: misogyny
polices social participants in order to uphold and reinforce basic and extreme forms of
dominance over women (33). The logic of this dominance similarly affects academic writing in
that academic language often marginalizes Others—the perpetuation of academic language as a
static, standardized set of rules furthers biases against race, socioeconomic status, and
educational backgrounds. In an opinion piece published in The New York Times, literary theorist,
scholar, and proponent of SLI, Stanley Fish claims standard English is “an instrument of power
and a device for protecting the status quo” (Fish part 3). It is important to note, though, that Fish
has made his living off of standard language ideology as a member of the status quo (a white,
heterosexual male with both an elite education and an elite position of power at an array of top
tier universities).
When scholars, academics, and those with power in academic settings act as though SLI
is the only option for academic writing, they ignore the diverse forms students’ aretȇ can take.
Some thinkers seem to realize SLI might not support every student, and yet they cling to it as a
dominant paradigm anyway. Stanley Fish, for example, advocates perpetuating SLI as a form of
empowerment for Others:
you’re not going to be able to change the world if you are not equipped with the tools that
speak to its present condition. You don’t strike a blow against a power structure by
making yourself vulnerable to its prejudices (Fish).
However, this sort of reasoning is a logical fallacy, circular reasoning, in which the proposition
looks like an argument, but is really just an assertion of the conclusion (Roberts-Miller 109). The
evidence—one cannot change the world—is only valid if Fish’s conclusion is true—one must be
equipped with the standardized language tools to enact change. Fish assumes standard English is
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the only “tool” that can enact change upon the world, marginalizing all other dialects. This
assumption “nullifies a vernacular, a personal experience, an emotion” of Fish’s audience—
mentees, students—limiting productivity of the relationship between educator/mentor and
student/mentee, and ultimately threatening a student’s aretȇ (Glenn 153).
In order to progress in higher education, especially through graduate school and working
towards tenure, there is an assumed white, middle-class knowledge implicitly understood by
enfranchised students and professors (Glenn 160). The patriarchal system of the academy does
not cater well to those outside of this perceived norm. Lippi-Green elaborates that “when
histories are written, they focus on the dominant class” (8).2 History is written in the voice of
those in power, of those with power and resources to control and distribute information.
Language prejudice happens “when folks dont get no jobs or get fired or whatever cuz they talk
and write Asian or black or with an Appalachian accent or sound like whatever aint the status
quo” (Young 110). Language and racial difference are intertwined, according to rhetorician and
language studies scholar Vershawn Ashanti Young, and both are reinforced by patriarchal
ideologies that allow for only one outcome to dominate.
Standard language ideology is a problem for disrupters and outliers of the academic
status quo. In particular, SLI is a problem for the feminist writing center space on university
campuses. While writing centers aim to serve all students of their university campus, the students
who are most likely to visit are those who do not align with the status quo. As such, the writing
center, an outlier space, does not support SLI because it actively works to promote individual
student voice in writing assignments through feminist mentorship and rhetorical listening.

2

Lippi-Green attributes this statement to Kwame Nkrumah, former president of Ghana and father of the pannational African movement. She says the phrase is widely paraphrased as “histories are written by the victors” (24).
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Feminist Mentoring at the Writing Center
The writing center at VCU operates under the principle that students learn and think best
through direct social interaction with other people. When discussing writing center operations in
workshops, we explain that the consultations are collaborative: students do not come to a
consultation, hand over their paper to a consultant, and wait for feedback. Rather, consultants
actively engage and listen to the student. Conversation, Kenneth Bruffee claims, is “the origin of
thought” because conversation stimulates reflective and critical though. People learn in “direct
social exchange with other people” (208). Learning to write and develop writing skills is
optimized when it becomes part of a social thinking and learning process.
Social interaction helps writing centers define and distinguish their spaces in relation to
the classroom experience. In this distinction, the writing center reflects Glenn’s feminist
mentoring by actively “diverging from masculinist forms of mentoring” (150). The writing
center rebuffs the hierarchical order of the classroom and the masculinist form of traditional topdown mentoring “between like-minded men of different ages” (Glenn 151). To support a
student’s quest for aretȇ, feminist mentorship centers collaboration, reciprocity, and
connection—all vital components that set a writing center space noticeably apart from other
academic spaces on campus.
Furthering this divergence, writing centers disavow the idea of a solitary author. Where
the typical classroom assignment imagines the student as a singular, solitary author, in the
writing center, the student is not isolated with his or her own ideas. Rhetorician Marilyn Cooper
presents the idea of “the solitary author” as someone who “sees his writing as a goal-directed
piece of work, the process of producing a text” (Ecology 366). Educators often frame their
students in these terms; even authors of composition textbooks approach their student audiences
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in this way. But Cooper suggests that classes can escape the “tyranny” of the solitary author
paradigm by developing an ecology of writing in “which students engage in group work,
activities such as collaborative brainstorming on a topic, discussions and debates of topics or
readings, writers reading their texts aloud to others, writers editing other writers’ texts” (Ecology
366). In fact, writing consultations demonstrate Cooper’s ecological approach because students
manage their writing by talking through their writing process, their ideas, and their approach to
writing. At the writing center, writing is not seen in terms of an end product, but as an active
reflection, deliberation, and dialogue that precedes and coincides with the formal writing
process.
By engaging with writing as a social process, the writing center consultant learns the
student’s perspective about their own writing voice. Personal, authorial voice is a challenge for
students to take ownership of, especially when people like Stanley Fish promote an idea that
some ways of writing make students “vulnerable to prejudice” (Fish). Young enacts performance
to demonstrate how standard language ideology removes all understanding of the mentee’s
personal identity: “dont nobody’s language, dialect, or style make them ‘vulnerable to
prejudice’... It be the way folks with some power perceive other people’s language . . . Black
English dont make it own-self oppressed” (110). When it comes to standard language ideology,
the people in positions of power have developed a standard to which they expect everyone to
conform. But this standard is the default dialect for the people with the power—that is, those
whose voice is defaulted as the norm do not experience the persecution and prejudice felt by
those whose voice is othered. Marginalized students who are unfamiliar with writing in the
standardized, default voice of the academy come to the writing center worried their papers do not
sound good enough, smart enough, or academic enough. Through the social process of writing
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consultations, writing consultant-mentors help students navigate the power dynamics of control
over one’s own writing voice.
Stanley Fish’s opinion piece exemplifies the power of the center in that it was published
by The New York Times, giving him an enormous audience. His articles have mainstream
distribution, which in itself is powerful. When someone like Stanley Fish, who is coming from
an academically privileged point of view, tells a large audience that language dialect or style is a
problem, he both creates and affirms language bias’ stronghold in and outside of academia,
bolstering a dominant and standardized language ideology. The academy, and professors, hold
similar, though smaller-scale forms power over the type of language use a student can employ.
The writing center consultant-as-mentor works against these patriarchal controls.
The consultant-as-mentor holds a unique position as both being a student-peer, but also
someone who understands the controls of the academy due to the nature of their position. That is,
the writing consultant is privy to the controls of both worlds, navigating both the academic status
quo and the outlier nature of writing centers. Thus, the consultant, as mentor, does as Glenn
suggests when employing feminist mentoring. The consultant acknowledges their position as
“residing in the center, the mentee in the margins,” and brings the student-mentee in to the center
by empowering and amplifying their voice (and control) over their own writing (Glenn
Rhetorical Feminism 150).
When the policing of language dictates how students convey their writing, students feel
disenfranchised, as if they do not have ownership over their own work. Cooper suggests writing
consultants can best help students achieve agency as writers
by helping them understand how and the extent to which they are not owners of their
texts; by helping them understand, in short, how various institutional forces impinge on
how and what they write and how they can negotiate a place for their own goals and
needs when faced with these forces. (Useful Knowledge 101)
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Here, Cooper makes clear that agency in writing does not depend on ownership of the writing,
but on constructing a point of view or position within the writing. This method correlates with
Glenn’s enhanced rhetorical feminist practice of bringing the mentee into the center on their
quest for aretȇ. To achieve agency and, by default, excellence in writing, consultants help
students find and negotiate the space between institutional demands and individual needs for an
assignment—thus bridging the gap between center and margin. Consultants by “virtue of their
constant contact with institutional constraints and with students’ lived experiences,” are best
positioned to empower students as agents of their own writing (Really Useful Knowledge 102).
The unique position of writing center consultants converges as the means for mutual
learning, aligning with feminist pedagogy in an inventive way that traditional classroom
interactions do not allow. Feminist mentor-consultants demonstrate their commitment to
“equality of underrepresented groups and to reciprocity of engagement” as a disruption to the
status quo (Glenn Rhetorical Feminism 150). The consultant is not a traditional authority within
the patriarchal academic structure; their authority and expertise derive from other interactions
with students in consultations, personal interactions with professors as a student (the consultant
is an undergraduate or graduate student herself), and an engagement with the institution’s
function as a patriarchal system. In this way, consultants are supports for the aretȇ quest by
empowering the students they meet.

Rhetorical Listening
Tutoring methods that promote mutual learning and collaboration enable invention and
engagement. The student arrives with the exigence for their meeting, but despite being studentcentered, the consultant’s role is to provide a focus for the session based on the stage of the
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writing process the student inhabits. To support students as agents of their own writing,
consultants engage in the feminist practice of rhetorical listening. Just as Hillary Clinton was
able to enact change by listening to her constituency, so are writing consultants better able to
support the needs of their student-mentees by using rhetorical listening. Feminist pedagogical
practices like rhetorical listening are well suited for writing center spaces. A rhetorical listening
approach alleviates the agonistic interactions that can occur with someone on the margins of a
hierarchical, patriarchal institution. The writing center, invariably, is a contact zone on the
university campus where two strangers meet and engage in a way that is both amiable and
generative. We can learn from this model in continuing to address agonism’s legacy in both
demagoguery and misogyny.
To engage with strangers productively, the goal of rhetorical listening is to enter
situations with “a stance of openness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any
person, test, or culture” (Ratcliffe 17). But that “stance of openness” cannot occur without
negotiating and critically interrogating “the existing (mis)perceptions about [race and gender]
and their intersections” (135). That is, writing consultants must avoid exacerbating or promoting
gender-blindness and color-blindness during meetings with students because these styles of
engagement reinforce the status quo. For men, gender-blindness means denying the privilege that
is associated with being male in U.S. culture, while for women it means accepting male privilege
as normal or natural. Acceptance of misogyny makes women feel as if their existence as female
is a problem that needs to be solved. In U.S. culture the same goes for white people—colorblindness means denying the privilege that comes with whiteness and also denying the
differences of other races. For anyone who is not white, color-blindness means being made to
feel race is a problem for she or he alone to solve (134). Had Stanley Fish acknowledged the
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privilege associated with his gender and race, his New York Times opinion piece would have
been read and received quite differently. He would have been unable to assert a dominant
language ideology without recognizing and complicating the patriarchal system from which he
benefits.
Within a patriarchal system, listening has both gender and racial bias. Modern gendered
listening bias stems from its origins in Socratic dialogues. The rise of rhetoric in ancient Greece
coincided with the already thriving agonistic culture of warfare. Aretê was associated with
physicality for the good of the state before it was associated with intellectual sparring and verbal
debates. Masculine listening occurs through “verbal duels” and waiting to speak while feminine
listening does not originate from the same agonism (Ratcliffe 21). A feminist approach to
rhetorical listening, as we see with Clinton’s listening tours, is nurturing and generative. Racial
bias in listening has a similar history to its gendered counterpart. bell hooks explains racial bias
harms progress within feminist movements because white women are often unwilling “to listen
to black women” (102):
Most white women dismissed us as “too angry,” refusing to reflect critically on the issues
raised. By the time, white women active in the feminist movement were willing to
acknowledge racism, accountability, and its impact on the relationships between white
women and women of color, many black women were devastated and worn out. We felt
betrayed . . . white women no show interest in racial issues. It seems at times as though
white feminists working in the academy have appropriated discussions of race and racism
while abandoning the effort to construct a space for sisterhood, a space where they could
examine and change attitudes and behaviors toward black women and all women of
color. (102-3)
An openness through listening can lead to closing divisions, healing feelings of betrayal, or
opening up dialogue for change and progress. When listening is dismissed, it becomes
undervalued and can be countered with aggression. The white women to whom hooks refers
became accusatory and dismissive when faced with the reality of racial bias within the feminist
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movement. The reinforcement of racial bias in feminism is not a problem for Black feminists to
solve. The white women who were closed off to understanding the Black perspective engaged in
a misogynist shut-down of rhetorical listening and intervention, leaving the issue of racial bias
unacknowledged and ignored.
Understanding the implications of these blindness biases are integral to the writing
center’s continued role as a feminist contact zone on campus. Glenn’s method of enhanced
feminist mentoring explains mentors are “fluent in the use of rhetorical concepts, practices, and
deliveries, especially in the power of dialogue, silence, and listening to enhance any rhetorical
transaction” (150). Mentors must make mutually trusting relationships with mentees, connections
that inform mentor and mentee of each other’s views and experiences. A shared commitment to
understanding each other’s point of view stems from rhetorical listening—it is really the only
way to effectively support a student’s quest to aretȇ. Too often the academy will assume a
certain level of comfort in an academic space, even assuming an investment in the patriarchal
status quo. But students gain agency through expression of their own identity (their gender, their
race, their voice, their cultural capital) in their own way— at the writing center, student
empowerment occurs when modes of writing and speaking beyond standard language ideology
are not diminished. Gender and race are parts of a student’s identity, carried with them at all
times. Writing center scholar Harry Denny refers to these pieces of identity as “cultural capital”
that doesn’t “translate easily for us in the academy” (103). Rhetorical listening practices support
bringing awareness to gender and racial bias and difference. In consultations, it is possible to
actually hear difference and promote productive communication cross-culturally.
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Conclusion
Trust is not easily cultivated. In the first chapter, I explored how social media influencers
cultivate trust with their following to supplant the personal relationships that are built through
friendship. In our current digital age, students engage in mentorship through networks, whether
face to face mentorship, like at the writing center, or online in digital spaces, or a combination of
the two. In a 2014 study, social scientists studied traditional adult-youth mentoring programs and
their use of social media in developing relationships. The study showed “media use does not
seem to detract from the closeness and quality of face-to-face mentoring relationships, but may
actually supplement and strengthen them” (Schwartz 212). That is, in rhetorical feminist
mentoring practice, social media can enhance the collaboration and connection between mentor
and mentee. In a social digital network, students achieve aretê by finding exemplars to serve as
mentors.
One path to aretê does not look the same for everyone, but achieving aretê hinges on
finding a mentor or exemplar as a part of the journey. Rhetorician John Gallagher explains
“certain kinds of people, namely exemplars, illustrate” qualities that lead to happiness in
classical virtue ethics (380). In order to enact virtue ethics, especially within academia, a student
must find someone who exemplifies virtues that foster their aretê. Using Twitter, for example, a
mentor acts as an exemplar for how academics should write, behave, and interact on a
widespread, public social media platform. Ethics philosopher Linda Zagzebski characterizes
exemplars as “those persons who are most imitable, and they are most imitable because they are
most admirable” (52). Using social media platforms for professional exposure and connection
can be extremely intimidating to new scholars, particularly if their social media use in the past
has been mostly between family and friends. Navigating the online world with a professional
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lens is quite different, but a digitally-versed rhetorical feminist mentor can model a healthy
social media presence that can lead to fruitful benefits.
Academic Twitter, a hashtag (#AcademicTwitter) that scholars use on Twitter’s platform
to signify an in-group of those involved in higher-education, encourages collaboration and
discussion between academics and scholars. Twitter is no longer an optional service for most
academics, but a means to furthering scholarship, announcing employment opportunities, sharing
work (and in-turn finding collaborators for work), and joining in on conversations beyond the
norm at one’s own institution. For mentor-mentee relationships, Twitter can act as a way to
practice feminist mentoring. To bring mentees in to the center that the mentor occupies, the
mentor can tag or post accomplishments of the mentee. For example, if a mentee gives a
conference presentation, the mentor can celebrate the mentee’s success online, while also
promoting the mentee to a new group of academics who might take interest in her scholarship.
Further, the mentee might write a tweet about a cause she is interested in, alerting the mentor to
an aspect of the mentee that had been previously unknown. In this way Twitter can act as a
mediated form of rhetorical listening in a mentoring relationship.
The Academic Twitter network functions as an exemplar for achieving aretê. The
hashtag #AcademicTwitter brings scholars together to inform the community at large about their
research—a tool for networking in academia that is hard to match face-to-face. Increasingly,
Twitter usage has become a must-have for those on the job market with one’s Twitter handle as
important to a CV as an email address. The Academic Twitter network enables users to share
content that fits within an intellectual and personal brand, positioning oneself as an exemplar of
their field. In this way, Academic Twitter-as-exemplar facilitates the quest for aretê, leading
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mentees to configure the professional and personal in a public forum by learning from the
collective network.
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CODA
Post-Truth and Social Media
The need for rhetorical media literacy is more urgent than ever as reliance on social
media networking and connections becomes intertwined with everyday life in the U.S. While
there was much to be learned from the 2016 election, as digital citizens we can consider the ways
we use social media as part of our daily lives. It’s important for young people to think critically
about how they choose to use social media, but it’s also important for those of us who did not
grow up with social media platforms at our fingertips to become more educated and sensitive
about what we consume online, particularly when considering political use of social media. For
online-based political marketing, campaigns cull thousands of pieces of data on just one
individual. This data tells a campaign marketer an individual’s demographics and interests that
enables a political campaign to mimic the type of concerns that would be discussed by friends in
targeted advertising. Trust built between friends is a commodity that political campaigns hope to
emulate because a friend’s endorsement of a political candidate represents more than just an
affinity for the candidate. Endorsing a candidate on the Facebook platform aligns the friend (or
family member) with the candidate’s views and opinions, and serves as a signal of the friend’s
personal set of virtues. Often one friend’s set of virtues impact those of another friend. How
people use and navigate social media speaks directly to how personal virtues are formed, how
one pursues aretê, and how one might influence the aretê quest of others.
There are forces along the quest to aretê that can mislead and persuade under the guise of
being an exemplar. Political advertising campaigns are one such force. Like social media
influencers, political campaigns hope to sell an ideal that ultimately does not benefit a person’s
pursuit of aretê, despite acting as a trusted exemplar. Political campaigns fuel constituencies’
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allegiance to an in-group for the benefit of the political candidate the campaign represents.
Online political marketing campaigns in particular are created to bring in members (or solidify
membership) to the political in-group while ostracizing others to an out-group. On social media
platforms like Facebook, campaign advertisements can home in on target audiences. This
attention to specific, targeted groups of people is called micro-targeting. By compiling data
points with the types of people who comprise their constituency, campaign advertising targets
specific sub-groups of the larger in-group following. Republican National Committee officials
say they have “invested over $300 million into their data operation since [the 2012 election] and
have collected roughly 3,000 data points on every voter in the country in a system jointly owned
by the Trump campaign and the RNC” (Broderick). Three thousand data points on each
individual person is an enormous amount of information and enables campaigns to micro-target
specific types of voters.
The large amount of data tells campaign marketers how to tweak their messages based on
more than location and gender—with three thousand data points marketers speak directly to
specific people to enact an agenda. Micro-targeted advertising allows candidates to cater to
smaller demographics of people with personalized messaging as if they were a friend, mentor, or
exemplar. In an article for The Atlantic, McKay Coppins explains the advantages of microtargeted ads:
An ad that calls for defunding Planned Parenthood might get a mixed response from a
large national audience, but serve it directly via Facebook to 800 Roman Catholic women
in Dubuque, Iowa, and its reception will be much more positive.
A specific ad created for a specific group of people feels small at first. How do 800 people make
or break an election? The strategy, though, is to reach small groups of people hundreds and
thousands of times over. The small forms of persuasion, coaxing, whispering from a candidate
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who speaks directly to an in-group are not isolated events. From June to November 2016,
Trump’s campaign dominated the Facebook advertising market, running 5.9 million ads
compared to Hillary Clinton’s 66,000 (Frier). The onslaught of advertising does more than
validate in-group supporters—it also seeks to ostracize those in the out-group.
Micro-targeted advertising in this way is partially responsible for voter suppression—a
tactic used to shrink an opposing electorate rather than expand a constituency base. This is a part
of the ploy to solidify in-group membership rather than trying to create more in-group members.
It is easier to reinforce beliefs than it is to convert someone’s beliefs. During Trump’s 2016
campaign, strategists created ads using clips from 1996 when Hillary Clinton called some
African American males “super predators” during a speech delivered at Keene State University
(CSPAN). These ads were created specifically to discourage black voters from showing up to the
polls (Green). Persuasion in the noise of millions of advertisements becomes less about
concentrating on new ideas and more about motivation through confirmation bias. If Trump’s
campaign can convince an African American population in Florida that Hillary Clinton
is/was/has always been a racist, then the motivation to vote for her or Trump (who has also said
racist things) eliminates the need or desire to vote in the first place. The feeling of hopelessness
when comparing candidates is disorienting for voters and obstructs an aretê quest. Sowing
confusion is more likely to benefit political campaigns than taking the time to negotiate with
dissenting voices from an out-group.
An abundance of information and advertising—advertising that is meant to satisfy and
confirm one’s in-group membership and identity—can be disorienting. Trump’s social media
coordinator Brad Parscale is responsible for Trump’s campaign tactics to shut down “dissenting
voices . . . to harness the democratizing power of social media . . . [by] using a megaphone to
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drown [them] out” (Coppins). Journalist Peter Pomerantsev calls this “censorship through noise”
(27). The “noise” is mass amounts of information that cause people to question what they
consider to be true, or to just not care anymore about whether information is true in the first
place. A candidate's political narrative can be one of fact or fiction. According to a political
science study, exposure to fact-checking may reduce misperceptions among supporters of
political candidates, but it will not necessarily change a voter’s mind about whom to support
(Nyhan 4). Matters of fact, therefore, are less important than in-group identity confirmation.
While the creators of the advertisements are one part of the information overload that
exists on personal social media news feeds and dashboards, the second part is those who share
the information. The reason why three thousand data points are needed to target one small group
of people is because cultivating trust is hard. Advertising on Facebook works because the
platform is set up as a network of friends and family members where trust is implicit. A friend or
family member who shares a political advertisement post for Trump, for example, is
acknowledging their support for Trump, sharing with their followers a badge of in-group
membership to the ideology of Trump’s persona. It is easier to unfollow or hide posts of said
family member if you disagree—just as it is easier to like or share the post if you agree—than it
is to express disgust with the advertisement’s narrative in the comments. Unfollowing and hiding
posts from people with opposing opinions is a way to manage the chaos of information. But this
also signifies one’s personal virtues. What does it mean to not engage with differing opinions?
What does it mean if I confront? What does it mean for my aretê quest to hide or unfollow those
with whom I disagree? What does it mean for me to keep the people I disagree with visible on
my newsfeed? Journalist Sean Illing suggests that by leaning more into the “narratives that strip
the world of its complexity” we reinforce our biases, creating a narrower and more isolated echo
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chamber (“Post-truth Prophets”). Social media use, in the beginning of what will be a long
history of online political campaigning, asks users to confront their personal virtues head on. Do
I want to live in a bubble of my own making on social media? Do I want to create an isolated
echo chamber or is part of my aretê journey opening myself up to differing views? Aretê is not a
simple, straight line, and the challenges presented by digital media persuasion complicate the
quest.
Rhetorical media literacy education is a step towards building an awareness of how we
are using social media. Our social media platform of choice reflects a personalized narrative of
our identity. Both who one follows and who one does not follow reflect who a person is and who
a person wants to be—we’re “authors of our own universes” (Illing). There is value in
acknowledging one’s own confirmation bias in constructing a social media echo chamber. When
a writer creates a universe, she knows the confines of that world—she knows what will make
that world prosper and she knows what types of villains would disrupt the peace of her created
universe. Political campaign advertisements that micro-target seek to undermine individuals
personal, created universes. Armed with millions of dollars and thousands of data points,
political demagogues want to creep in and disrupt personalized digital ecosystems. The existence
of personalized social media echo chambers is not going anywhere—with each new iteration of
social networking applications, the reality of their longevity becomes more clear. Rhetorical
media literacy is a defense against the intruders of our created universes. By arming ourselves
with awareness of the noise and of bias, it becomes more possible to fortify an attack or a barrier
against the interlopers on the quest to aretê.
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APPENDIX
Third Grade: “Oral Language”

Fourth Grade: “Communication: Speaking
Listening, Media Literacy”

Standard 3.1: The student will use effective
communication skills in group activities.
a) Listen attentively by making eye contact,
facing the speaker, asking questions, and
summarizing what is said.
b) Ask and respond to questions from teachers
and other group members.
c) Explain what has been learned.
d) Use language appropriate for context.
e) Increase listening and speaking vocabularies.

Standard 4.1: The student will use effective oral
communication skills in a variety of settings.
a) Present accurate directions to individuals and
small groups.
b) Contribute to group discussions across content
areas.
c) Seek ideas and opinions of others.
d) Use evidence to support opinions.
e) Use grammatically correct language and
specific vocabulary to communicate ideas.
f) Communicate new ideas to others.
g) Demonstrate the ability to collaborate with
diverse teams.
h) Demonstrate the ability to work
independently.

Understanding the Standard (Teacher Notes):
● The intent of this standard is that students will
communicate effectively during discussions in
group settings.
● Students will interact with group members by
asking and responding to questions and
explaining what has been said or learned.
● Teacher should provide opportunities for
students to develop skills for both speaking
(expressive) and listening (receptive)
vocabulary (e.g., have one student read a
paragraph that is rich in descriptive detail
aloud to a partner or group of students. Those
students then draw the scene as they listen.).

Understanding the Standard (Teacher Notes):
● The intent of this standard is that students will
continue to develop the skills needed to
communicate in a variety of settings.
● Students will strengthen their communication
skills by contributing to individual and smallgroup discussions, seeking the ideas and
opinions of others and beginning to use
evidence to support their own personal
opinions.
● Students will also refine the skill of conveying
accurate directions to individuals or small
groups in such a way that others can follow
the directions. Emphasis will be on directions
for doing things that have a natural sequence
or organization.

Essential Understandings:
All students should:
● Participate effectively in group activities by
using language appropriate for the context and
by taking turns in conversations and moving
group discussions forward.
● Increase listening and speaking vocabularies.

Essential Understandings:
All students should:
● Participate effectively in discussions by:
○ Asking clarifying questions;
○ Providing explanations when
necessary;
○ Reflecting on the ideas and opinions
of others;
○ Supporting opinions with examples
and details
● Demonstrate an ability to work independently
and in small groups.

Figure 7. Virginia SOLs Comparison of 3.1 and 4.1
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